**Appendix**

**“Democratic Ideals and Levels of Political Participation”**

**Table of Contents**

I. Latent class model choice

II. Latent class measurement equivalence tests

III. Descriptive statistics and variable documentation, including missing data

IV. Regression analyses, additional documentation

**I. Latent class model choice**

Table A1 displays the goodness of fit statistics for selecting the optimal number of latent classes, and for testing for measurement equivalence across countries. The BIC is the most widely used statistic for assessing goodness of fit, and a smaller BIC indicates better model fit. A complementary approach is to evaluate the percent change in the likelihood chi-squared statistic L² in comparison to the one-class model (Magidson and Vermunt 2004: 176-177). Based on these considerations, we selected the five-class model.

Table A1. Latent class analysis model fit statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Number of latent classes* | BIC(LL) | CAIC(LL) | L² | Change L² | Class.Err. |
| 1-Class | 1194720 | 1194742 | 414310 |  | 0.00 |
| 2-Class | 1020489 | 1020523 | 239949 | -0.42 | 0.04 |
| 3-Class | 973207 | 973253 | 192535 | -0.54 | 0.06 |
| 4-Class | 955536 | 955594 | 174733 | -0.58 | 0.08 |
| **5-Class** | **936685** | **936755** | **155751** | **-0.62** | **0.10** |
| 6-Class | 929586 | 929668 | 148521 | -0.64 | 0.12 |

Notes: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=51,724). BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. Entries are test statistics for latent class models identifying one and more clusters of respondents, based on 11 indicators of democratic ideals with ‘country’ as a covariate, missings imputed, and design weights applied. Optimal model highlighted in bold font.

**II. Latent class measurement equivalence tests**

It is important to test whether the latent classes identified in the optimal model are equivalent across the countries in the data (Kankaraš, Moors & Vermunt, 2011; Kankaraš & Vermunt, 2014). Table A2 includes the fit statistics of tests for two kinds of measurement equivalence:

1. Partial equivalence means that the same latent construct (in this study, the five democratic ideals identified by the latent class groups) is valid across all of the groups under investigation (in this study, 29 countries). The test of partial equivalence can be understood as parallel to the test for metric equivalence in factor analysis.
2. Homogeneous equivalence can be understood as parallel to the test for scalar equivalence in factor analysis.

The equivalence tests in Table A2 show that the partial equivalence model has the lowest BIC and is the optimal model. The subsequent models remove direct effects for single indicators to test whether full equivalence is found for specific indicators, testing first for indicators with the lowest bivariate residuals. The increased BIC in the models that selectively remove direct effects for single indicators shows that no indicators are fully homogeneous across countries, and therefore the partial equivalence model with direct effects (i.e. that allows the intercepts for each item to vary across countries) is the optimal model. The five-class partial equivalence model is comparable across countries, and therefore can be used for next-step cross-national analyses.

Table A2. Latent class analysis measurement equivalence tests

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Models* | BIC(LL) | CAIC(LL) | L² | Change L² | Class.Err. |
| Homogeneous model | 929450 | 929632 | 326900 |  | 0.10 |
| Heterogeneous model | 917778 | 919808 | 295067 | -0.10 | 0.10 |
| **Partial equivalence, all direct effects** | **913246** | **914044** | **303976** | **-0.07** | **0.11** |
| Partial equivalence, 1 direct effect removed (meprinf) | 913905 | 914647 | 305245 | -0.07 | 0.10 |
| Partial equivalence, 1 direct effect removed (oppcrgv) | 913885 | 914627 | 305225 | -0.07 | 0.10 |

Notes: European Social Survey, 2012 (n=51,724). BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square statistics. Entries are test statistics for latent class measurement equivalence tests across countries for the 5-class model, based on 11 indicators of democratic ideals with ‘country’ as a covariate, missings imputed, and design weights applied. Optimal model highlighted in bold.

**III. Descriptive statistics and variable documentation, including missing data**

Table A3. Descriptive statistics for regression analyses

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| **Individual level variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political ideals | 51,724 | 0.163 | 0.321 | 0 | 1 |
| Social ideals | 51,724 | 0.198 | 0.348 | 0 | 1 |
| High ideals | 51,724 | 0.238 | 0.400 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium ideals | 51,724 | 0.303 | 0.417 | 0 | 1 |
| Low ideals | 51,724 | 0.099 | .282 | 0 | 1 |
| Overall participation measure | 54,558 | 0.380 | 0.485 | 0 | 1 |
| Institutionalized participation | 54,543 | 0.216 | 0.411 | 0 | 1 |
| Non-institutionalized Participation | 54,520 | 0.289 | 0.454 | 0 | 1 |
| Sex (female = 1) | 54,656 | 0.544 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 54,540 | 48.307 | 18.592 | 15 | 103 |
| Education | 54,309 | 2.060 | 0.798 | 1 | 3 |
| Left-right ideology | 46,457 | 5.230 | 2.338 | 0 | 10 |
| Household income feeling | 53,977 | 2.79 | 0.926 | 1 | 4 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 52,602 | 5.16 | 2.574 | 0 | 10 |
| **Country-level variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Democracy years | 53921 | 47.952 | 33.808 | 0 | 94 |
| Gini coefficient | 41106 | 0.293 | 0.0395 | 0.237 | 0.379 |
| Good governance index | 54,673 | 76.186 | 19.856 | 27.629 | 98.349 |
| GDP per capita (1000 USD) | 54,673 | 31.830 | 12.522 | 8.223 | 61.896 |
| Post-authoritarian | 54,673 | .493 | .500 | 0 | 1 |
| Country-level composite | 53,921 | 0.000 | 1.825218 | -3.286 | 2.864 |

**Missing data:** The reported findings include all cases in the data, including those with missing data on the questions regarding democratic ideals. We conducted three analyses to ascertain the effect of missing data: (a) A listwise deletion of all cases that are missing data on any of the 11 democracy indicators (b) Retaining all cases including those missing data on all 11 indicators (c) Retaining cases that have missing data on only one indicator in the battery, thereby analyzing 94.61% of the research population (these cases were missing at random across countries and across the 11 democracy indicators). Analyses based on these alternate codings of missing data yielded the same substantive findings, and as noted, the analyses reported in the article are based on option (c).

**Democratic ideals indicator coding for LCA robustness tests:** The advantage of recoding the original 11-category items into more parsimonious categories for the latent class analysis is to avoid the problem of sparse data in analyzing categorical variables (Agresti 2007). The variables in this battery are skewed toward the high end of the 11-point scale, so use of the original 11-category items creates a problem of sparse data. The 3-point recode conducted to produce the findings reported in this article recode 0-7 to 1; 8-9 to 2; and 10 to 3. We also performed robustness tests to investigate whether the findings were affected by alternate codings, including: the original 11-cateory response items; dichotomous cutoffs at 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, as well as the mean or median of each variable; an alternate 3-point coding (0-8=1, 9=2, 10=3) and a 4-point coding (0-7=1, 8=2, 9=3, 10=4). These tests all yielded similar substantive results as those reported in the article.

**Individual-level variable coding and operationalization**: All individual-level variables are derived from the European Social Survey, 2012. The coding and operationalization of the main dependent and independent variables (i.e. democratic ideals and political participation) are fully documented in the manuscript. The following table documents the additional individual-level variable measures and recodes when relevant.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Values** |
| Sex | Female = 1; Male = 0 |
| Age | Continuous |
| Education | Low = Maximum lower secondary; Medium = Maximum higher secondary; High = Advanced vocational and tertiary |
| Left-right ideology | 0 to 10 scale, 0=left, 10=right |
| Income feeling | Respondents’ feeling about household income: 1= Very difficult; 2 = Difficult’ 3 = Coping; 4 = Living Comfortably |

**Country-level variable measures and sources:** The country-level variable sources and operationalization are documented in the article. As noted, a country-level composite variable was created as a linear combination of the separate country-level variables to create an overall summary of ‘advanced democracies’. Findings using the composite variable based on all five country-level variables were substantively indistinguishable from findings that used a country-level composite that excludes the Gini coefficient variable, which is not available in eight countries in the study (see footnote 3). The manuscript therefore presents findings using the composite variable based on four country-level variables, and principle component analysis output for this variable is documented below:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Principal components/correlation | Number | of | obs | = | 53,921 |
|  | Number | of | comp. | = | 4 |
|  | Trace |  |  | = | 4 |
| Rotation: (unrotated = principal) | Rho |  |  | = | 1 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Component | Eigenvalue | Difference | Proportion | Cumulative |
| Comp1 | 3.331 | 2.953 | 0.833 | 0.833 |
| Comp2 | 0.378 | 0.203 | 0.095 | 0.927 |
| Comp3 | 0.175 | 0.060 | 0.044 | 0.971 |
| Comp4 | 0.115 | . | 0.029 | 1.000 |

**IV. Regression analyses, additional documentation**

List of subsequent tables; relevant table or figure in manuscript noted in [brackets]

Table A4. Explaining Overall Political Participation

[Appendix to Table 5, negative binomial specification]

Table A5: Explaining Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Participation

[Appendix to Figure 2, multi-level logistic specification]

Table A6: Explaining Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Participation

[Appendix to Figure 2, negative binomial specification]

Table A7. Social and Political Groups Compared

[Appendix to Figure 3, multi-level logistic specification]

Table A4: Explaining Overall Political Participation, Negative Binomial

[Appendix to Table 5, negative binomial specification]

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model  I | Model  II | Model III | Model IV | Model  V | Model VI | Model VII |
| *Individual-level variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Democratic ideals**  (ref: Medium ideals) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low ideals | -0.457\*\*\* | -0.317\*\*\* | -0.365\*\*\* | -0.318\*\*\* | -0.318\*\*\* | -0.318\*\*\* | -0.317\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.031) |
| High ideals | 0.225\*\*\* | 0.273\*\*\* | 0.246\*\*\* | 0.273\*\*\* | 0.274\*\*\* | 0.273\*\*\* | 0.273\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Political rights | 0.314\*\*\* | 0.286\*\*\* | 0.293\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.286\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| Social rights | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.131\*\*\* | 0.145\*\*\* | 0.145\*\*\* | 0.145\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| **Age** | -0.001\*\* | -0.001\*\* | -0.001 | -0.001\*\* | -0.001\*\* | -0.001\*\* | -0.001\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| **Sex** (1=female) | -0.094\*\*\* | -0.076\*\*\* | -0.033\* | -0.074\*\*\* | -0.074\*\*\* | -0.074\*\*\* | -0.076\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) |
| **Education** (ref: Low) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Medium | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.344\*\*\* | 0.297\*\*\* | 0.331\*\*\* | 0.330\*\*\* | 0.330\*\*\* | 0.344\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| High | 0.561\*\*\* | 0.726\*\*\* | 0.651\*\*\* | 0.709\*\*\* | 0.709\*\*\* | 0.709\*\*\* | 0.726\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| **Left-right** | -0.050\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.041\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| **Income feeling**  (ref: very difficult) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Difficult | 0.177\*\*\* | 0.098\*\* | 0.039 | 0.089\*\* | 0.089\*\* | 0.090\*\* | 0.098\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| Coping | 0.395\*\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* | 0.068\* | 0.125\*\*\* | 0.125\*\*\* | 0.126\*\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.034) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) |
| Living comfortably | 0.639\*\*\* | 0.201\*\*\* | 0.132\*\*\* | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.200\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.032) |
| **Satisfaction democracy** | 0.028\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| *Country-level variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Established democracy** |  | 0.011\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.002) |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Gini** |  |  | -5.520\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (2.584) |  |  |  |  |
| **Good governance** |  |  |  | 0.018\*\*\* |  |  |  |
| (index) |  |  |  | (0.004) |  |  |  |
| **GDP/cap** |  |  |  |  | 0.032\*\*\* |  |  |
| (1000 USD) |  |  |  |  | (0.006) |  |  |
| **Post-authoritarian** |  |  |  |  |  | -0.836\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.147) |  |
| **Country-level** |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.221\*\*\* |
| **composite variable** |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.038) |
| Constant | -0.227\*\*\* | -0.632\*\*\* | -0.909\*\*\* | -0.682\*\*\* | -0.682\*\*\* | -0.682\*\*\* | -0.632\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.028) | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.028) |
| Random intercept |  | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.213\*\* | 0.207\*\*\* | 0.164\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.135\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.042) | (0.066) | (0.055) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.037) |
| Observations | 43786 | 43128 | 34809 | 43786 | 43786 | 43786 | 43128 |

Notes: ESS 2012 in 29 countries. Random effects multi-level regression, negative binomial count outcome

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A5: Explaining Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Participation

[Appendix to Figure 2, multi-level logistic specification]

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Institutionalized* | | *Non-institutionalized* | |
|  | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
| **Democratic ideals** (ref: Med.) |  |  |  |  |
| Low ideals | -0.432\*\*\* | -0.300\*\*\* | -0.621\*\*\* | -0.471\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) | (0.051) | (0.046) | (0.049) |
| High ideals | 0.098\*\* | 0.187\*\*\* | 0.285\*\*\* | 0.411\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.032) |
| Political rights | 0.284\*\*\* | 0.264\*\*\* | 0.507\*\*\* | 0.509\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.034) |
| Social rights | 0.055 | 0.073\* | 0.246\*\*\* | 0.267\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.033) |
| **Age** | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| **Sex** (1=female) | -0.284\*\*\* | -0.266\*\*\* | 0.049\* | 0.091\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.023) |
| **Education** (ref: Low) |  |  |  |  |
| Medium | 0.186\*\*\* | 0.363\*\*\* | 0.253\*\*\* | 0.430\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.029) | (0.032) |
| High | 0.683\*\*\* | 0.877\*\*\* | 0.638\*\*\* | 0.955\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.032) |
| **Left-right** | -0.023\*\*\* | -0.003 | -0.083\*\*\* | -0.060\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| **Income feeling**  (ref: very difficult) |  |  |  |  |
| Difficult | 0.083 | -0.012 | 0.292\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.056) | (0.048) | (0.052) |
| Coping | 0.374\*\*\* | 0.061 | 0.623\*\*\* | 0.224\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) | (0.053) | (0.045) | (0.049) |
| Living comfortably | 0.743\*\*\* | 0.222\*\*\* | 0.991\*\*\* | 0.294\*\*\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.056) | (0.047) | (0.053) |
| **Satisfaction democracy** | 0.053\*\*\* | -0.008 | 0.042\*\*\* | -0.030\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| **Country-level composite** |  | 0.241\*\*\* |  | 0.343\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.045) |  | (0.062) |
| Constant | -2.233\*\*\* | -2.075\*\*\* | -1.382\*\*\* | -1.178\*\*\* |
|  | (0.071) | (0.112) | (0.065) | (0.134) |
| Random Intercept |  | 0.190\*\*\* |  | 0.366\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.052) |  | (0.099) |
| Observations | 43730 | 43072 | 43719 | 43061 |

ESS 2012 in 29 countries. Multi-level logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A6: Explaining Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Participation

[Appendix to Figure 2, negative binomial specification]

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Institutionalized* | | *Non-institutionalized* | |
|  | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
| **Democratic ideals** (ref: Med.) |  |  |  |  |
| Low ideals | -0.359\*\*\* | -0.226\*\*\* | -0.529\*\*\* | -0.396\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.038) | (0.037) |
| High ideals | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.335\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Political rights | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.371\*\*\* | 0.340\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.021) |
| Social rights | 0.065\* | 0.070\* | 0.198\*\*\* | 0.195\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.023) | (0.022) |
| **Age** | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| **Sex** (1=female) | -0.266\*\*\* | -0.245\*\*\* | 0.040\*\* | 0.063\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| **Education** (ref: Low) |  |  |  |  |
| Medium | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.340\*\*\* | 0.227\*\*\* | 0.335\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| High | 0.617\*\*\* | 0.758\*\*\* | 0.519\*\*\* | 0.675\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| **Left-right** | -0.023\*\*\* | -0.010\* | -0.075\*\*\* | -0.057\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| **Income feeling**  (ref: very difficult) |  |  |  |  |
| Difficult | 0.100\* | 0.036 | 0.227\*\*\* | 0.128\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Coping | 0.303\*\*\* | 0.071 | 0.457\*\*\* | 0.161\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.034) | (0.035) |
| Living comfortably | 0.571\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.677\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) | (0.046) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| **Satisfaction democracy** | 0.041\*\*\* | -0.001 | 0.020\*\*\* | -0.025\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| **Country-level composite** |  | 0.179\*\*\* |  | 0.260\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.037) |  | (0.047) |
| Constant | -0.296\*\*\* | -0.658\*\*\* | -1.103\*\*\* | -3.076\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.335) |
| Random Intercept |  | 0.129\*\*\* |  | 0.206\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.036) |  | (0.056) |
| Observations | 43786 | 43128 | 43786 | 43128 |

ESS 2012 in 29 countries. Random effects multi-level regression, negative binomial count outcome.

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A7. Social and Political Groups Compared

[Appendix to Figure 3, multi-level logistic specification]

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Overall Participation* | | *Institutionalized* | | *Non-institutionalized* | |
|  | Model  I | Model  II | Model  III | Model  I | Model  II | Model VI |
| **Democratic ideals**  (ref: Social Rights) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political rights | 0.252\*\*\* | 0.246\*\*\* | 0.227\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.261\*\*\* | 0.249\*\*\* |
|  | (0.035) | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.036) | (0.039) |
| **Age** | -0.002\*\* | -0.003\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| **Sex** (1=female) | -0.075\* | -0.027 | -0.286\*\*\* | -0.249\*\*\* | 0.099\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.039) | (0.034) | (0.037) |
| **Education** (ref: Low) | 0.339\*\*\* | 0.523\*\*\* | 0.292\*\*\* | 0.450\*\*\* | 0.316\*\*\* | 0.465\*\*\* |
| Medium |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.046) | (0.051) | (0.055) | (0.059) | (0.049) | (0.054) |
| High | 0.766\*\*\* | 1.053\*\*\* | 0.746\*\*\* | 0.919\*\*\* | 0.680\*\*\* | 0.942\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.052) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.048) | (0.053) |
| **Left-right** | -0.061\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* | -0.022\*\* | 0.001 | -0.084\*\*\* | -0.060\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| **Income feeling**  (ref: very difficult) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Difficult | 0.149\* | -0.018 | 0.024 | -0.096 | 0.212\*\* | 0.052 |
|  | (0.073) | (0.080) | (0.088) | (0.093) | (0.079) | (0.086) |
| Coping | 0.483\*\*\* | 0.035 | 0.272\*\*\* | -0.072 | 0.517\*\*\* | 0.095 |
|  | (0.067) | (0.076) | (0.081) | (0.087) | (0.073) | (0.081) |
| Living comfortably | 0.941\*\*\* | 0.200\* | 0.627\*\*\* | 0.082 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.218\* |
|  | (0.071) | (0.082) | (0.084) | (0.092) | (0.076) | (0.087) |
| **Satisfaction democracy** | 0.066\*\*\* | -0.017\* | 0.059\*\*\* | -0.006 | 0.045\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| **Country-level composite** |  | 0.356\*\*\* |  | 0.268\*\*\* |  | 0.357\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.056) |  | (0.045) |  | (0.063) |
| Constant | -1.024\*\*\* | -0.678\*\*\* | -2.167\*\*\* | -1.945\*\*\* | -1.077\*\*\* | -0.779\*\*\* |
|  | (0.096) | (0.147) | (0.113) | (0.144) | (0.101) | (0.159) |
| Random Intercept |  | 0.289\*\*\* |  | 0.171\*\*\* |  | 0.358\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.081) |  | (0.050) |  | (0.100) |
| Observations | 15946 | 15653 | 15943 | 15650 | 15938 | 15645 |

ESS 2012 in 29 countries. Multi-level logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses. Negative binomial specification for these models fail to converge.

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001